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PERRY LOCAL EDUCATORS ASS'N, Federal/Civil T~~ 
EVELYNE. WADDELL & JUDITH M. DIETRICH 
1. SUMMARY: On the merits, the question presented is 
whether the CA7 erred in holding unconstitutional--on equal-
protection and first-amendment grounds--a contract between a union 
and a school district under which the union, the exclusive 
l);~iSS ~ rr~ !Vt> ~ F-~ /.l,Uu·s-~~/ 
bur-~ ~ tL- ~/·cl-~ ~ CAs. ~~ 
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bargaining representative of its members, was given preferential -----access rights to members' (teachers) mailboxes. The propriety of 
seeking this Court's review by way of appeal is also at issue. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Once, there were two 
unions: Perry Education Ass'n (petr PEA) and Perry Local Educators 
Ass'n (resp PLEA). Neither was an exclusive bargaining agent and 
both had equal access to teachers' mailboxes. Then PLEA challenged -<=-___ PEA's status as de facto barganing representative. PELA lost '£E e 
subsequent election and PEA was formally certified as exclusive 
bargaining representative. Anticipating continuing opposition f rom 
PLEA, PEA negotiated a labor contract designed to cement its status. 
In that contract, the school board (1) guaranteed PEA's access to ------the teachers' mailboxes; (2) permitted it to use the inter-school 
delivery system to the extent that the sc hool district incurred no 
extra expense by such use, and (3) promised to deny those rights to 
any other "school empoyee organization"--a term of art defined by 
~ -----------_ .. --
Indiana law to mean "any organization which has school employees as 
its members and one of whose primary purposes is representing school 
employees in dealing with their employer." 
In addition to PEA, the mail system is used by the school 
district for official business. And teachers use the mail system to 
~
send personal messages. The district also allows outside groups to 
access mail boxes with approval of any building principal. Local 
parochial schools, church groups, YMCAs, and Cub Scout units do so. 
PEA and PLEA are equally free to use school bulletin 
boards, distribute material in the teachers' lounge, and, with prior 
approval of building principals, make announcements on the public 
- - 3. 
address system. Both can hold meetings on school property after 
school hours. And the CA7 assumed, for purposes of the appeal, that 
Ind. law would prevent PEA from using the mail system during the 
period immediately prior to any inter-union election. 
The CA7 held the challenged provisions in the collective-
bargaining agreement unconstitutional under the first amendment and 
~
the equal-protection clause. The CA7 explained that the special 
duties of an exclusive bargaining agent could not justify the 
"denial of equal access for other labor groups." The CA7 relied 
primarily on this Court's insistence on viewpoint-neutrality in 
public-forum cases. The CA7 rejected the argument that the access 
policy could be defended as a means of preserving labor peace. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr notes that the CA7 itself reported 
that of the ten cases on point, "including two decided by federal 
Courts of Appeals, five decided only at the district court level, 
and three decided by state appellate courts[,] [a]ll but one, a 
district court opinion, rejected such claims. Indeed, many of these 
cases upheld exclusive access policies considerably broader than the 
one followed by the Perry Township school board." In the two 
leading cases, Connecticut State Federation of Teachers v. Board of 
Educ. Members, 538 F. 2d 471 (CA2 1976) and Memphis American 
Federation of Teachers Local 2032 v. Board of Education, 534 F. 2d 
699 (CA6 1976), the CA2 and the CA6 upheld grants to a majority 
union of the exclusive right to use school meeting facilities and 
bulletin boards, as well as the internal mail system. 
Petr maintains that this is not a public-forum case and 
that the CA7 erred in analyzing it as one. Petr cites Greer v. 
- - 4. 
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 n.10 (1976), in which the Court explained 
that the fact that some civilians had been "invited to appear at 
Fort Dix did not of itself convert Fort Dix into a public forum, or 
confer upon political candidates a First or Fifth Amendment right to 
conduct their campaigns here." 
Resp notes that there is no basis for this court's 
appellate jurisdiction. Resp maintains that the case does involve a 
public forum and that strict scrutiny is appropriate because speech 
is a fundamental right. 
4. DISCUSSION: The appeal should be dismissed as there 
is no basis for this Court's appellate jurisdiction. Because of the 
length of its current docket, the Court might want to dismiss and 
deny to see if the conflict resolves itself. It is possible that 
the CA7 might reconsider in another case and adopt the approach of 
the other courts. 
Because this seems unlikely, I recommend a grant to 
resolve the split. Moreover, the case presents an interesting and ----
important question involving the interaction of labor policy and 
first amendment rights in a rather nebulous arena: a voluntarily 
created, limited, "public forum." 
I recommend a grant. There is a response. 
12/20/81 Becker Opin in petn 
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I do not recall whether the above case is on our list 
for summer memoranda. If so, I invite your attention to 
the memoranda by the Solicitor General that advises us of 
the Private Express Statutes. The SG states that these 
statutes "generally prohibit the carriage of letters over 
post routes without the payment of postage", and that the 
Postal Service takes the position that the distribution of 
union letters over a public school inter-school mail system 
violates these statutes. 
As these statutes were not considered by either of the 
courts below, the threshold question is whether we should 
remand the case for reconsideration. I would like to have, 
in due time, the views of the responsible law clerk on this 
question. I am not thinking of any elaborate memorandum. 
This may well be a judgment call. 
I have read the briefs in this case, as well as CA 7's 
opinion, and my tentative view is to affirm that decision 
if we reach the merits. At this time, I do not think a full 
bench memo on the merits is indicated. Prior to argument, 
I would like a bob-tail memo addressing primarily the effect 
of the Court's decision in U.S. Postal Service v. Council 
of Greenburgh, and my opinion in Widmar. 
L.~(J. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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school di r ic~ uan to a collective-bargaining agreement, 
grants ~ its inte~~ its te chers' exclu; ive 
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bargaining representative but not to a rival union. 
2. Whether t~Equal Protection Clause is violated by the 
same exclusive preference for the bargaining representative. 
• 
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I. Background 
A. Facts 
Each school in the Perry Township, Marion County, Indiana, 
public-school system allots a mailbox to each teacher in the 
school. Letters and other material to and from teachers are de-
livered through an internal inter-school mail system. Prior to 
1978 the Board of Education permitted appellant Perry Education 
Association (PEA) and appellee Perry Local Education Association 
(PLEA) to use the system. In 1977 PEA became the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of Perry Township teachers. The ensuing 
collective-bargaining agreement guaranteed PEA' s access to the 
mail system, provided that the school system does not have to 
"make special arrangements, incur extra expenses, or devote [ex-
tra] time." The agreement specifies that such access "shall not ----be granted ~ an~ ther ~ hool emp~ anization." Brief for 
at 3-4. 
e Board permits private organizations such as Cub Scouts 
church groups to use the mail system. PLEA is permitted to 
the schools' bulletin boards and public-address systems, to 
distribute materials between classes, and to hold meetings in 
school buildings after school hours. 
B. Decisions Below 
PLEA brought suit in S.D. Ind., contending that the prefer-
ence for PEA violates the First Amendment and the Equal Protec-
~ 
tion Clause. The DC (Noland, J.) granted PEA's motion for summa- f) L 
ry judgment. Pet. at 36a. Since the mail system is used for 
- - 3. 
internal teacher communication on school-related matters, it is 
not a public forum. PLEA has no First Amendment right of access. 
And PEA's status as the exclusive bargaining representative makes 
the Board's preference rational under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
The CA7 reversed. 652 F. 2d 1286 (CA7 1981), Pet at la. 
Visiting Judge Wisdom, joined by Chief Judge Fairchild and Judge 
Cummings, agreed that the mail system is not a traditional public 
forum, but found that the Board's preference for PEA still must 
be assessed under a high standard of scrutiny. Though the Board 
has a legitimate reason for allowing PEA to use the system, it 
has no legitimate reason for providing exclusive use. Permitting 
PLEA to use the system would impose minimal additional costs and 
would not interfere with PEA's duties as exclusive bargaining 
representative. The exclusive preference for PEA thus violates 
both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. 
Court postponed consideration of /;V.J... . . ,~J The 
~~earing on the merits. 
jurisdiction until a 
An amicus brief in support of affirmance 
Cll7 
y has been filed by Public Service Research Council. The Solicitor .5 G-
General has filed a memorandum for the U.S. Postal Service. 
I 
II. Jurisdiction 
PEA argue that appellate jurisdiction exists under 28 u.s.c. 
§1254 (2). If the collective-bargaining agreement's exclusive-
access provision had been adopted by the school district as a 
regulation pursuant to statutory authority, it would constitute a 
"state statute" under §1254(2) . 1 Illinois ex rel. Mccollum v. 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
7 .~ 
- - 4. 
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Since the agreement was 
adopted pursuant to statutory authority, it also should be deemed 
a "state statute." 
I recommend dismissing for want of jurisdiction. Admitted--
ly, Mccollum helps PEA's position. In finding appellate juris-
diction where a school board permitted religious teaching in 
public-school classes, the Court noted that "the State Supreme 
Court has sustained the validity of the program on the ground 
that the Illinois statutes granted the board authority to estab-
lish such a program. This holding is sufficient to show that the 
validity of an Illinois statute was drawn in question . " 
' l \ ' 
Id. at 206. But when a state age!!SY bargains it engages in a 
different process from normal policymaking. The relationship to 
the authorizing statute is less direct. Moreover, PEA's theory 
essentially leads to appellate jurisdiction over every constitu-
tional challenge to a state agency's action that is not clearly 
ultra vires. The last thing this Court needs to do is to enlarge 
! 
its appellate jurisdiction by adopting an expansive definition of 
"state statute." 
1PEA cites your statement inibood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 253 (Powell, J., concurring): "The 
collective bargaining agreementto which a public agency is a 
party is not merely analogous to legislation, it has all the 
attributes of legislation for the subjects with which it deals •• 
•• [One of its provisions] has the same force as if the school 
board had adopted it by promulgating a regulation." 
Though this statement supports PEA's analogy, I do not think 
it determines your osition on the jurisdictional question. That 
a collective- arga1ning agreement has the effect of a government 
regulation for purposes of the First Amendment does not mean it 
constitutes a statute under §1254(2). 
- - 5. 
Upon dismissing the appeal, the Court should treat it as a 
petition for cert and grant the petition. -----
III. Discussion on the Merits 
A. The Postal Service Position ( S G-5 ~~ j 
The Private Express statutes prohibit the carriage of let-
ters over post routes without the payment of postage. 18 u.s.c. 
§§1693-99; 39 u.s.c. §§601-606. The USPS has stated in several 
advisory opinions that provision of free inter-school mail ser-
vice for unions or teachers violates these statutes. See Memo-
randum for USPS at la. The USPS does not argue that this viola-
tion affects the issues decided below, but brings the matter to 
the Court's attention so that any decision will not inadvertently 
affect the USPS's ability to achieve compliance with the Private 
Express statutes in similar situations. Id. at 2. 
In your memorandum of July 19 you raised the possibility of 
1AP.~a remand for reconsideration in light of these statutes. I rec-
c~Ammend against a remand. There is no basis on which the CA7 
~- could dispose of the case to avoid the constitutional issues. 
The USPS is not a party. It has not instituted any action 
against Perry Township, nor has it suggested that any such action 
is imminent. The validity of the USPS's legal position has not 
been tested in court. The CA7 may not raise and resolve the is-
sue sua sponte. 
Moreover, such an action at most could result in a fine and 
a requirement that postage be paid. The exclusive service might 
continue. PEA probably would pay the postage, since Perry Town-
• 
- - 6. 
ship's contractual obligation ends if "extra expenses" are in-
curred, but the inter-school service might remain advantageous 
because of its greater speed than normal mail delivery. PLEA's 
constitutional claims would not be mooted. 
B. Analysis of the Constitutional Questions 
Your July 19 memorandum requested that I focus on the appli-
cation to this case of United States Postal Serv. v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981), and Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981) {Powell, J.) • 
1. The Standard of Review 
The CA7 correctly held that the mail system was not a public J,1,,o./-
a,..,-
forum in the traditional sense. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455~ 
~ 
(1980), and Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), involved 
the public streets, a classic public forum that may not be closed 
by the Government. There is no doubt that Perry Township ~ould 
close its mail system to all unofficial communications. The ~ - - '2,,u:, 
question thus is whether the Carey/Mosley high standard of review 1,4.c.L_ 
-- "the legislation [must] be finely tailored to serve substan~ 
tial state interests, and the justifications offered for any dis-~$ 
tinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized," Carey, 447 
U.S. at 461-62 -- applies in this case. 
In Widmar v. Vincent you stated that" [a] university differs 
in significant respects from public forums such as streets or 
parks or even municipal theaters," 102 s. Ct. at 273 n.5, but 
held that "[t]he Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain 






was not required to create the forum in the first place." Id. at 
273. In contrast Postal Service stated that "the First Amendment 
does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned 
or controlled by the government," 453 U.S. at 129, and held that 
the U mail is not a public forum. Accordingly, all the 
Government had to show was that its restriction was "reasonable" 
and "content-neutral." Id. at 131 n.7. 
This case falls somewhere between Widmar and Postal Service. 
( Widmar does not control because Perry Township has not made its 
1 mail system "generally open to the public." 102 S. Ct. at 273. 
Postal Service does not control because Perry Township has opened 
its mail system to some but not all organizations, whereas the 
USPS does not treat civic notices "any differently from the way 
it treats any of the other mail it processes." 453 U.S. at 127. 
The [rucial issu3 thus is whether a heightened standard of 
review applies when there is a "limited" public forum, i.e., 
~
whether so long as some groups have been invited to use a govern-
mental means of communication, the government's limiting classi-
fication must be narrowly tailored to serve a substantial state 
interest. I think the CA7 properly answered "yes." 
Postal Service emphasized that the USPS did not discriminate 
in applying its ban on civic notices without postage. The Court 
did not suggest that a rational-basis test would be applied if 
the USPS exempted certain groups or certain types of notices from 
the general prohibition. To the contrary, the Court held that 
regulation of a nonpublic forum must be content-neutral. 





Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), do not hold that a rational-basis 
test is proper to review subject-matter restrictions on access to 
nonpublic forums. 
Greer and Lehman properly are viewed as 
narrow exceptions to the general prohibition 
against subject-matter distinctions. In both 
cases, the Court was asked to decide whether a 
public facility was open to all speakers. 
[The Court] concluded that partisan political 
speech would disrupt the operation of govern-
mental facilities even though other forms of 
speech posed no such danger. (Consolidated 
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 u.s 
530, 539 (1980) (Powell, J.) .) 
Moreover, Greer relied on the government's policy, "objectively 
and evenhandedly applied, of keeping official military activities 
there wholly free of entanglement with partisan political cam-
paigns of any kind." 424 U.S. at 839. 
These concerns do not apply here. Providing access to PLEA "Ub 
will not "disrupt the legitimate governmental purpose for whi~~ 
the property has been dedicated." Consolidated Edison, 447 u.s.~ -'Z.c. 
at 538. The schools' educational functions will be unimpaired~ 
And Perry Township's policy is not neutral toward communications . 
'-' ' , 
from teachers' unions to teachers. A heightened standard of re-
view is appropriate. 
2. Applying the Heightened Standard of Review 
PEA's argument that the exclusive-access provision promotes 
labor peace is unacceptable. First, PLEA's other uses of school 
facilities do not appear to have disrupted labor relations, even 
though labor peace seems more endangered by the permitted prac-
tice of distribution of PLEA literature in the teachers' lounges 
than by the prohibited practice of distribution through the 
- -
9 • 
s ~ tem. Moreover, by seeking to justify the 
exclusive-access provision on Perry Township's interest in labor 
peace PEA essentially concedes that the provision was meant to 
silence PLEA. Finally, the insertion of the exclusive-access 
provision in the labor agreement demonstrates that it was viewed 
by both parties not as serving Perry Township's interests but as 
a concession won by PEA for PEA's own purposes. 
The argument that PLEA will burden the mail system is equal-
ly meritless. Postal Service accepted the USPS's concern about 
overstuffing of mailboxes, but that case involved no discrimina-
tion. The interest in avoiding an overflow justifies a general, 
nondiscriminatory ban, but not a partial ban that draws lines 
between similarly-situated speakers. The former is evaluated 
under the rational-basis test, the latter under heightened scru-
tiny. If a burden arises the Board of Education may adopt rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions. The restriction 
imposed here does not fall into that category. CK~ 3. Implications for First Amendment Doctrine 
~ Affirmance of the CA? means that the equal-protection prin- ~ 
 1 ~ r 
. d l c1ples of Mosley and progeny are exten ed to~ governmentally-
controlled means of communication. (The remaining difference 
between a public and nonpublic forum is that the latter may be 
closed altogether.} PEA raises the legitimate fear that the de-
cision will force an all-or-nothing choice betweeen permitting 
full public access or none at all. Since it often may be infea-
sible for the government entirely to foreclose access to its fa-
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9-+ vv ~ 
ly -expanded. 
is important /4e a~::.=:~/:::~jA" This issue -
date general public access to the school mail system. Facilitat-
ing teachers' employment-related communications is a limited pur-
pose that differs from purposes that would be served by permit-
ting general public access. Just as a school board may limit the 
subjects addressed at its public meetings, see City of Madison 
School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 
U.S. 167, 175 n.8 {1976), it should be able to limit the use of 
its internal mail system. 
This result follows if one distinguishes between adoption of 
a principle of limited access and application of that principle. 
For example, PerryAownship may conclude that the internal mail 
system should be used only for notices relating to teachers' em-
ployment. -- This 1 imi ting principle seems acceptable under any standard of review because it relates to the proper functioning 
and purposes of the governmental body, as was true in Greer. But 
if Perry Township determines that this principle encompasses 
union communications, its decision to favor a particular union 
must be closely scrutinized. Similarly, even if the Board le-
gitimately may distribute civic and charitable notices but not 
partisan political notices, its exclusion of particular civic or ~ 
charitable groups would require strong justificat i on. 
3. The First Amendment/Equal Protection Intersection 
The CA 7 determined that the high First Amendment level of 
scrutiny also was proper under the Equal Protection Clause: 
"Because free speech is a fundamental right, 




speakers •.. implicates that right, the fun-
damental rights strand of strict scrutiny ap-
plies to such discrimination •... In princi-
ple, of course, the stringency with which 
these tools should be applied could vary be-
tween the first amendment and equal protection 
clauses. • . • In this case • . . there is no 









This is accurate. If the CA7's First Amendment holding is cor- tzc/-
~~ 
rect, its equal-protection holding also is correct. 2 
The very fact that the one follows from the other leads me ¼_ 
to question the need for the equal-protection ground. Combining /w-o 
two constitutional provisions in one analysis can result in nov-
• el, confusing, and expansive theories. 3 The Court may want to 
2The CA7's suggestion that minority unions may constitute 
a suspect class, see Pet. at 22a n.41, is wrong. 
3For example, Taxation with Representation v. Regan, No. 
79-1464 (CADC Mar. 26, 1982} (en bane}, appeal pending, No. 81-
2338, declared unconstitutional a federal statute that permits 
veterans organizations, but no other nonprofit tax-exempt 
organizations, to lobby and still receive contributions that are 
tax-deductible to the donor. Whether or not the result is 
correct, the explanation in Judge Mikva's majority opinion is 
rather unusual: 
The whole of Taxation's argument well exceeds the sum of its 
parts. Taxation's case is weak if it is viewed solely as a First 
Amendment claim, because the Constitution does not require 
Congress to subsidize First Amendment activity. Taxation also 
has a weak case solely in terms of equal protection; Congress has 
vast leeway under the Constitution to classify the recipients of 
its benefits and to favor some groups over others. But a First 
Amendment concern must inform the equal protection analysis in 
this case. Courts must scrutinize with special care any act by 
Congress that facilitates the speech of one speaker over another, 
even when legislation is enacted in the dry, classification-
ridden context of the Internal Revenue Code. By subsidizing the 
lobbying activities of veterans' organizations while failing to 
subsidize the lobbying of Taxation and other charitable groups, 
Congress has violated the equal protection guarantees of the 









), The appeal should be dismissed. A collective-bargaining 
agreement is not a "state statute" under §1254(2). Cert should 
be granted. 
z The case should not be remanded for reconsideration in light 
of the possible i llegality of free inter-school mail service for 
unions and faculty. The Postal Service has not brought any ac-
tion against Perry Township. The CA7 cannot raise and decide the 
issue sua sponte. 
J The CA7's decision should be affirmed. A heightened stan-
dard of review is er where the government provides limited 
~
access to a means of communication. PEA has failed to demon-
strate a substantial state interest in the exclusive-access pro-
vision. Perry Township's interest in labor peace is not incon-
sistent with PLEA's use of the mail system, and in any event may 
not justify an attempt to impede PLEA's communication with teach-
ers. The asserted interest in avoiding a burden on the mail sys-
tem is inadeqaute in this case. The Court should emphasize that 
the First Amendment does not prohibit limitations on access to 
governmental means of communication. But the limiting principle 
must be closely related to the purposes of the governmental enti-
ty and must be evenhandedly applied. 
- -
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1st DRAFT  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-896 
PERRY EDUCATION ASSN., APPELLANT v. PERRY 
LOCAL EDUCATION ASSN., ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1982] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Perry Education Association is the duly elected exclusive 
bargaining representative for the teachers of the Metropoli-
tan School District of Perry Township, Indiana. A collective 
bargaining agreement with the Board of Education provided 
that Perry Education Association, but no other union, would 
have access to the interschool mail system and teacher mail-
boxes in the Perry Township schools. The issue in this case 
is whether the denial of similar access to the Perry Local 
Education Association, a rival teacher group, violates the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
The Metropolitan School District of Perry Township, Indi-
ana, operates a public school system of thirteen separate 
schools. Each school building contains a set of mailboxes for 
the teachers. Interschool delivery by school employees per-
mits messages to be delivered rapidly to teachers in the dis-
trict. 1 The primary function of this internal mail system is to 
'The United States Postal Service, in a submission as amicus curiae, 
suggests that the interschool delivery of material to teachers at various 
schools in the district violates the Private Express statutes, 18 U. S. C. 
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transmit official messages among the teachers and between 
the teachers and the school administration. In addition, 
teachers use the system to send personal messages and indi-
vidual school building principals have allowed delivery of 
messages from various private organizations. 2 
Prior to 1977, both the Perry Education Association (PEA) 
and the Perry Local Education Association (PLEA) repre-
sented teachers in the school district and apparently had 
equal access to the interschool mail system. In 1977, PLEA 
challenged PEA's status as de facto bargaining represent-
ative for the Perry Township teachers by filing an election 
petition with the Indiana Education Employment Relations 
Board (Board). PEA won the election and was certified as 
the exclusive representative, as provided by Indiana law. 
Ind. Code Ann. § 20-7.5--1.2(1). 
The Board permits a school district to provide access to 
communication facilities to the union selected for the dis-
charge of the exclusive representative duties of representing 
the bargaining unit and its individual members without hav-
ing to provide equal access to rival unions. 3 Following the 
hibit the carriage of letters over postal routes without payment of postage. 
We agree with the Postal Service that this question does not directly bear 
on the issues before the Court in this case. Accordingly, we express no 
opinion on whether the mail delivery practices involved here comply with 
the Private Express statute or other Postal Service regulations. 
2 Local parochial schools, church groups, YMCAs, and Cub Scout units 
have used the system. The record does not indicate whether any requests 
for use have been denied, nor does it reveal whether permission must sepa-
rately be sought for every message that a group wishes delivered to the 
teachers. 
3 See Perry Local Educator's Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F. 2d 1286, 1291 & n. 
13 (CA7 1981). It is an unfair labor practice for a school employer to 
"dominate, interfere or assist in the formation or administration of any 
school employer organization or contribute financial or other support to it." 
Ind. Code § 20-7.5--1-7.(a)(2) The Indiana Education Employment Rela-
tions Board has held that a school employer may exclude a minority union 
from organizational activities which take place on school property and may 
deny the rival union "nearly all organizational conveniences." Pike v. In-
- -
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election, PEA and the school district negotiated a labor con-
tract in which the school board gave PEA "access to teachers' 
mailboxes in which to insert material" and the right to use 
the interschool mail delivery system to the extent that the 
school district incurred no extra expense by such use. The 
labor agreement noted that these access rights were being 
accorded to PEA "acting as the representative of the teach-
ers" and went on to stipulate that these access rights shall 
not be granted to any other "school employee organization" -
a term of art defined by Indiana law to -mean "any organiza-
tion which has school employees as members and one of 
whose primary purposes is representing school employees in 
dealing with their employer.'.' 4 The PEA contract with 
these provisions was renewed in 1980 and is presently in 
force. 
The exclusive access policy applies only to use of the mail-
boxes and school mail system. PLEA is not prevented from 
using other school facilities to communicate with teachers. 
PLEA may post notices on school bulletin boards; may hold 
meetings on school property after school hours; and may, 
with approval of the building principals, make announce-
ments on the public address system. Of course, PLEA also 
may communicate with teachers by word of mouth, tele-
phone, or the United States mail. Moreover, under Indiana 
law, the preferential access of the bargaining agent may con-
tinue only while its status as exclusive representative is insu-
lated from challenge. Ind. Code Ann. §20-7.5-1.10(c)(4). 
While a representation contest is in progress, unions must be 
afforded equal access to such communication facilities. 
PLEA and two of its members filed this action under 42 
U. S. C § 1983 (1976) against PEA and individual members of 
dependent Professional Educators, No. U-76-16-5350 (May 20, 1977) 
(holding that denying rival union use of a school building for meetings was 
not unfair labor practice, but that denying the union use of school bulletin 
boards was unfair labor practice). 
• Ind. Code Ann. § 20-7.5--1-2.(k). 
- -
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the Perry Township School Board. Plaintiffs contended that 
PEA's preferential access to the internal mail system violates 
the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. They sought injunctive and de-
claratory relief and damages. Upon cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, the district court entered judgment for the 
defendants. Perry Local Educators Ass'n v. Hohlt, IP 
79-189-C, (S.D. Ind. 1980). 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 
652 F. 2d 1286 (1981). The court held that once the school 
district "opens its internal mail system to PEA but denies it 
to PLEA, it violates both the Equal Protection Clause and 
the First Amendment." Id. at 1290. It acknowledged that 
PEA had "legal duties to the teachers that PLEA does not 
have" but reasoned that "without an independent reason why 
equal access for other labor groups and individual teachers is 
undesirable, the special duties of the incumbent do not justify 
opening the system to the incumbent alone." Id. at 1300. 
The PEA now seeks review of this judgment by way of ap-
peal. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction to the 
hearing of the case on the merits. 454 U. S. 1140 (1981). 
II 
We initally address the issue of our appellate jurisdiction 
over this case. PEA submits that its appeal is proper under 
28 U. S. C. § 1254(2) (1976), which grants us appellate juris-
diction over cases in the federal courts of appeals in which a 
state statute has been held · repugnant to the Constitution, 
treaties, or laws of the United States. We disagree. No 
state statute or other legislative action has been invalidated 
by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has held 
only that certain sections of the collective bargaining agree-
ment entered into by the school district and PEA are con-
stitutionally invalid; the Indiana statute authorizing such 
agreements is left untouched. 
- -
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PEA suggests, however, that because a collective bargain-
ing contract has "continuing force and [is] intended to be ob-
served and applied in the future," it is in essence a legislative 
act, and, therefore a state statute within the meaning of 
§ 1254(2). King Manufacturing Co. v. City Council of Au-
gusta, 277 U. S. 100, 104 (1928). In support of its position, 
PEA points to our decisions treating local ordinances and 
school board orders as state statutes for § 1254(2) purposes, 
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 927 n. 2 (1975); Illi-
nois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 203 
(1948); Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 
257-258 (1934). In these cases, however, legislative action 
was involved-the unilateral promulgation of a rule with con-
tinuing legal effect. Unlike a local ordinance or even a 
school board rule, a collective bargaining agreement is not 
unilaterally adopted by a lawmaking body; it emerges from 
negotiation and requires the approval of both parties to the 
agreement. Not every government action which has the ef-
fect of law is legislative action. We have previously empha-
sized that statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly con-
strued, Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, 42 n. 1 
(1970), and in light of that policy, we do not find that § 1254(2) 
extends to cover this case. 5 We therefore dismiss the ap-
peal for want of jurisdiction. See, e. g. Lockwood v. J effer-
son Area Teachers Ass'n, (No. 81-2236, October 4, 1982) 
-- U. S. --, (appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction 
and certiorari denied). 
Nevertheless, the decision below is subject to our review 
by writ of certiorari. 28 U. S. C. §2103 (1976); Palmore v. 
5 Appellants' reliance upon Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. , 431 U. S. 209 
(1977) is misplaced. In Abood, appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1257(2) (1976) was proper because the constitutionality of the state stat-
ute authorizing the negotiation of agency shop agreements was at issue. 
See Jurisdictional Statement in Abood, No. 75-1153, at 5. 
- -
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United States, 411 U. S. 389, 396 (1973). The constitutional 
issues presented are important and the decision below con-
flicts with the judgment of other federal and state courts. 6 
Therefore, regarding PEA's jurisdictional statement as a pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari, we grant certiorari. 
III 
The primary question presented is whether the First 
Amendment, applicable to the states by virtue of the Four-
teenth Amendment, is violated when a union that has been 
elected by public school teachers as their_ exclusive bargain-
ing representative is granted access to certain means of com-
munication, while such access is denied to a rival union. 
There is no question that constitutional interests are impli-
cated by denying PLEA use of the interschool mail system. 
"It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex-
pression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines 
6 Constitutional objections to similar access policies have been rejected 
by all but one other federal or state court to consider the issue. See 
Connecticut State Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education, 538 F. 2d 
471 (CA2 1976); Memphis American Federation of Teachers Local 2032 v. 
Board of Education, 534 F. 2d 699 (CA6 1976); Teachers Local 3724 v. 
North St. Francis County School District, 103 L.R.R.M. 2865 (E.D. Mo. 
1979); Haukvedahl School District No. 108, No. 7~641 (N.D. Ill. May 
14, 1976); Federation of Delaware Teachers v. De La Warr Board of Edu-
cation, 335 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del. 1971); Local 858, American Federation of 
Teachers v. School District No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970); 
Maryvale Educators Ass'n v. Newman, 70 A.D. 2d 758, 416 N.Y.S. 2d 
876, appeal denied, 48 N.Y. 2d 605, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 1025 (1979); Geiger v. 
Duval County School Board, 357 So. 2d 442 (Fla. App. 1978); Clark Class-
room Teachers Assoc. v. Clark County School District, 91 Nev. 143,532 P. 
2d 1032 (1975) (per curiam). The only case holding unconstitutional a 
school district's refusal to grant a minority union access to teacher's mail-
boxes or other facilities while granting such privileges to a majority union 
is Teachers Local 399 v. Michigan City Area Schools, No. 72-S-94 (N.D. 
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School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969); Healy v. James, 
408 U. S. 169 (1972). The First Amendment's guarantee of 
free speech applies to teacher's mailboxes as surely as it does 
elsewhere within the school, Tinker v. Des Moines School 
District, supra, and on sidewalks outside, Police Department 
of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). But this is not to 
say that the First Amendment requires equivalent access to 
all parts of a school building in which some form of communi-
cative activity occurs. "Nowhere [have we] suggested that 
students, teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitu-
tional right to use all parts of a school building or its immedi-
ate environs ·for . . . unlimited expressive purposes." 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 117-118 (1972). 
The existence of a right of access to public property and the 
standard by which limitations upon such a right must be eval-
uated differ depending on the character of the property at 
issue. 
A 
In places which by long tradition or · by government fiat 
have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the 
state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed. 
At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks which "have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, 
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions." Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939). 
In these quintessential public forums, the government may 
not prohibit all communicative activity. For the state to en-
force a content-based exclusion it must show that its regula-
tion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that 
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Carey v. Brown, 
447 U. S. 455, 461 (1980). The state may also enforce regu-
lations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are 
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and leave open ample alternative chan-
- -
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nels of communication. United States Postal Service v. 
Council of Greenburgh, 453 U. S. 114, 132 (1981); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U. S. 530, 
53~6 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 115; 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. 
State of New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147 (1939). 
A second category consists of public property which the 
state has opened for use by the public as a place for expres-
sive activity. The Constitution forbids a state to enforce 
certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public 
even if it was not required to create the forum in the first 
place. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981) (university 
meeting facilities); City of Madison Joint Schoo_l District v. 
Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 
U. S. 167 (1976) (school board meeting); Southeastern Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975) (municipal the-
ater). 7 Although a state is not required to indefinitely re-
tain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it 
is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional pub-
lic forum. Again, however, reasonable time, place and man-
ner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohi-
bition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling 
state interest. Widmar v. Vincent, supra at 269-270. 
Public property which is not by tradition or designation a 
forum for public communication is governed by different 
standards. We have recognized that the "First Amendment 
does not guarantee access to property simply because it is 
owned or controlled by the government." United States 
Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, supra at 129. In 
addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the state 
7 A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by 
certain groups, e. g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981) (student 
groups), or for the discussion of certain subjects, e. g., City of Madison 
Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations 
Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167 (1976) (school board business). 
-------------------------------· ----- -- -
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may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communi-
cative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is 
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely 
because public officials oppose the speaker's view. Id. at 
131, n. 7. As we have stated on several occasions, "the 
State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to 
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it 
is lawfully dedicated." Id., at 129; Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 
828, 836 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 48 (1966). 
The school mail facilities at issue here fall within this third 
category. The Court of Appeals recognized that Perry 
School District's interschool mail system is not a traditional 
public forum: ''We do _not hold that a school's internal mail 
system is a public forum in the sense that a school board may 
not close it to all but official business if it chooses." 652 F. 
2d at --. On this point the parties agree. 8 Nor do the 
parties dispute that, as the District Court observed, the 
"normal and intended function [of the school mail facilities] is 
to facilitate internal communication of school related matters 
to teachers." Perry Local Educators Ass'n v. Hohlt, IP 
79-189-C (1980), at--. The internal mail system, at least 
by policy, is not held open to the general public. It is instead 
PLEA's position that the school mail facilities have become a 
"limited public forum" from which it may not be excluded be-
cause of the periodic use of the system by private non-school 
connected groups, and PLEA's own unrestricted access to 
the system prior to PEA's certification as exclusive repre-
sentative. 
Neither of these arguments is persuasive. The use of the 
internal school mail by groups not affiliated with the schools 
is no doubt a relevant consideration. If by policy or by prac-
tice the Perry School District has opened its mail system for 
indiscriminate use by the general public, then PLEA could 
justifiably argue a public forum has been created. This, 
8 See Brief of Appellees at 9 and Tr. of Oral Arg. at 41. 
- -
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however, is not the case. As the case comes before us, there 
is no indication in the record that the school mailboxes and 
interschool delivery system are open for use by the general 
public. Permission to use the system to communicate with 
teachers must be secured from the individual building princi-
pal. There is no court finding or evidence in the record 
which demonstrates that this permission has been granted as 
a matter of course to all who seek to distribute material. We 
can only conclude that the schools do allow some outside 
organizations such as the YMCA, Cub S~outs, and other civic 
and church organizations to use the facilities. This type of 
selective access does not transform government property 
into a public forum. In Greer v. Spock, supra, at 838 n. 10, 
the fact that other civilian speaker and entertainers had 
sometimes been invited to appear at Fort Dix did not convert 
the military base into a public forum. And in Lehman v. 
Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (Opinion of BLACKMUN, 
J.), a plurality of the Court concluded that a city transit sys-
tem's rental of space in its vehicles for commercial advertis-
ing did not require it to accept partisan political advertising. 
Moreover, even ifwe assume that by granting access to the 
Cub Scouts, YMCAs, and parochial schools, the school dis-
trict has created a "limited" public forum, the constitutional 
right of access would in any event extend only to other enti-
ties of similar character. While the school mail facilities thus 
might be a forum generally open for use by the Girl Scouts, 
the local boys' club and other organizations that engage in ac-
tivities of interest and educational relevance to students, 
they would not as a consequence be open to an organization 
such as PLEA, which is concerned with the terms and condi-
tions of teacher employment. 
PLEA also points to its ability to use the school mailboxes 
and delivery system on an equal footing with PEA prior to 
the collective bargaining agreement signed in 1978. Its ar-
gument appears to be that the access policy in effect at that 
time converted the school mail facilities into a limited public 
- -
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forum generally open for use by employee organizations, and 
that once this occurred, exclusions of employee organizations 
thereafter must be judged by the constitutional standard ap-
plicable to public forums. The fallacy in the argument is that 
it is not the forum, but PLEA itself, which has changed. 
Prior to 1977, there was no exclusive representative for the 
Perry school district teachers. PEA and PLEA each repre-
sented its own members. Therefore the school district's pol-
icy of allowing both organizations to use the school mail facili-
ties simply reflected the fact that both unions represented 
the teachers and had legitimate reasons for use of the sys-
tem. PLEA's previous access was consistent with the school 
district's preservation of the facilities for school-related busi-
ness, and did not constitute creation of a public forum in any 
broader sense. 
Because the school mail system is not a public forum, the 
School District had no "constitutional obligation per se to let, 
any organization use the school mail boxes." Connecticut St. 
Federation of Teachers v. Bd of Education Members, 538 F. 
2d 471, 481 (CA21976). In the Court of Appeals' view, how-
ever, the access policy adopted by the Perry schools favors a 
particular viewpoint, that of the PEA, on labor relations, and 
consequently must be strictly scrutinized regardless of 
whether a public forum is involved. There is, however, no 
indication that the school board intended to discourage one 
viewpoint and advance another. We believe it is more accu-
rate to characterize the access policy as based on the status of 
the respective union's rather than their views. Implicit in 
the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make dis-
tinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker 
identity. These distinctions may be impermissible in a pub-
lic forum but are inherent and inescapable in the process of 
limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the 
intended purpose of the property. The touchstone for eval-
uating these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in 
light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves. 
- -
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B 
The differential access provided PEA and PLEA is reason-
able because it is wholly consistent with the district's legiti-
mate interest in "preserv[ing] the property . . . for the use to 
which it is lawfully dedicated." Postal Service, supra, at 
129-130. Use of school mail facilities enables PEA to per-
form effectively its statutory obligations as exclusive repre-
sentative of all Perry Township teachers. 9 Conversely, 
PLEA does not have any official responsibility in connection 
with the school district and need not be · entitled to the same 
rights of access to school mailboxes. We observe that pro-
viding exclusive access to recognized bargaining represent-
atives is a permissible labor practice in the public sector. 10 
9 The Court of Appeals refused to consider PEA's access justified as "of-
ficial business" because the School District did not "endorse" the content of 
its communications. We do not see the necessity of such a requirement. 
PEA has official duties as representative of Perry township teachers. In 
its role of communicating information to teachers concerning, for example, 
the collective bargaining agreement and the outcome of grievance proce-
dures, PEA neither seeks nor requires the endorsement of school adminis-
trators. The very concept of the labor-management relationship requires 
that the representative union be free to express its independent view on 
matters within the scope of their representational duties. The lack of an 
employer endorsement does not mean that the communications do not per-
tain to the "official business" of the organization. 
10 See, e. g. Broward County School Board, 6 FPER § 11088 (Fla. 
PERC, 1980); Union County Board of Education, 2 NJPER 50 (N.J. 
PERC, 1976). Differentiation in access is also permitted in federal em-
ployment, and, indeed, it may be an unfair labor practice under 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7116(a)(3) (1976) to grant access to internal communication facilities to 
unions other than the exclusive representative. That provision states that 
it shall be an unfair labor practice for an agency to "sponsor, control or oth-
erwise assist any labor organization" aside from routine services provided 
other unions of "equivalent status." A number of administrative decisions 
construing this language as it earlier appeared in Executive Order 11491, 
§ 19(a)(3), have taken this view. See, e.g., Dept. of the Army, Asst. Sec. 
Labor/Managment Reports (A/SLMR) No. 654 (U. S. Dept of Labor, 
1976); Commissary, Fort Meade, Dept of the Army, A/SLMR No. 793; 
- -
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We have previously noted that the "designation of a union as 
exclusive representative carries with it great responsibil-
ities. The tasks of negotiating and administering a collective 
bargaining agreement and representing the interests of em-
ployees in settling disputes and processing grievances are 
continuing and difficult ones." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 
431 U. S. 209, 221 (1977). Moreover, exclusion of the rival 
union may reasonably be considered a means of insuring 
labor-peace within the schools. The policy "serves to pre-
vent the District's schools from becoming a battlefield for in-
ter-union squabbles." 11 
The Court of Appeals accorded little or no weight to PEA's 
special responsibilities. In its view these responsibilities, 
while justifying PEA's access, did not justify denying equal 
access to PLEA. The Court of Appeals would have been 
correct if a public forum were involved here. But the inter-
nal mail system is not a public forum. As we have already 
stressed, when government property is not dedicated to open 
Dept of the Air Force, Grissom Air Force Base, A/SLMR No. 852 (U. S. 
Dept of Labor, 1977); Dept of Transportation, Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, 1 FLRA No. 48 (1979). 
Exclusive access provisions in the private sector have not been directly 
challenged, and thus have yet to be expressly approved, but the Board and 
the courts have invalidated only those restrictions that prohibit individual 
employees from soliciting and distributing union literature during non-
working hours in nonworking areas. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U. S. 
322 (1974); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945); NLRB 
v. Arrow Molded Plastics, Inc., 653 F. 2d 280, 283-284 (CA6 1981); Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 212 NLRB 133, 134 (1974). 
11 Haukvedahl v. School District No. 108, No. 75C--3641 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
This factor was discounted by the Court of Appeals because there is no 
showing in the record of past disturbances stemming from PLEA's past ac-
cess to the internal mail system or evidence that future disturbance would 
be likely. We have not required the such proof be present to justify the 
denial of access to a non-public forum on grounds that the proposed use 
may disrupt the property's intended function. See, e. g. Greer v. Spock, 
424 u. s. 828 (1976). 
- -
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communication the government may-without further justifi-
cation-restrict use to those who participate in the forum's 
official business. 12 
Finally, the reasonableness of the limitations on PLEA's 
access to the school mail system is also supported by the sub-
stantial alternative channels that remain open for union-
teacher communication to take place. These means range 
from bulletin boards to meeting facilities to the United State 
mail. During election periods, PLEA is assured of equal ac-
cess to all modes of communication. There is no showing 
here that PLEA's ability to communicate with teachers is se-
riously impinged by the restricted access to the internal mail 
system. The variety and type of alternative modes of access 
present here compare favorably with those in other non-pub-
lic forum cases where we have upheld restrictions on aecess. 
See, e.g. Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. at 839 (servicemen free to 
attend political rallies off-base); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 
12 The Court of Appeals was also mistaken in finding that the exclusive 
access policy was not closely tailored to the official responsibilities of PEA. 
The Court of Appeals thought the policy overinclusive--because the collec-
tive bargaining agreement does not limit PEA's use of the mail system to 
messages related to its special legal duties. The record, however, does 
not establish that PEA enjoyed or claimed unlimited access by usage or 
otherwise; indeed, the collective bargaining agreement indicates that the 
right of access was accorded to PEA "acting as the representative of the 
teachers . . . "In these circumstances, we do not find it necessary to de-
cide the reasonableness of a grant of access for unlimited purposes. 
The Court of Appeals also indicated that the access policy was 
underinclusive because the school district permits outside organizations 
with no special duties to teachers to use the system. As we have already 
noted in text, see p. --, there was no district policy of open access for 
private groups and, in any event, the provision of access to these private 
groups does not undermine the reasons for not allowing similar access by a 
rival labor union. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 838 n. 10 (1976) 
("The fact that other civilian speakers and entertainers had sometimes 
been invited to appear at Fort Dix ... surely did not leave the authorities 
powerless thereafter to prevent any civilian from entering Fort Dix to 
speak on any subject whatever.") 
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817, 827-828 (1974) (prison inmates may communicate with 
media by mail and through visitors). 
IV 
The Court of Appeals also held that the differential access 
provided the rival unions constituted impermissible content 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. We have rejected this conten-
tion when cast as a First Amendment argument, and it fares 
no better in equal protection garb. As we have explained 
above, PLEA did not have a First Amendment or other right 
of access to the interschool mail system. The grant of such 
access to PEA, therefore, does not burden a fundamental 
right of the PLEA. Thu.s, the decision to grant such 
priviliges to the PEA need not be tested by the strict scru-
tiny applied when government action impinges upon a funda-
mental right protected by the Constitution. See San Anto-
nio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. l, 17(1973). The 
school district's policy need only rationally further a legiti-
mate state purpose. That purpose is clearly found in the 
special responsibilities of an exclusive bargaining represent-
ative. See supra, at --. 
The Seventh Circuit and PLEA rely on Police Department 
of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U. S. 92 (1972) and Carey v. 
Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980). In Mosely and Carey, we 
struck down prohibitions on peaceful picketing in a public fo-
rum. In Mosely, the City of Chicago permitted peaceful 
picketing on the subject of a school's labor-management dis-
pute, but prohibited other picketing in the immediate vicinity 
of the school. In Carey, the challenged state statute barred 
all picketing of residences and dwellings except the peaceful 
picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dis-
pute. In both cases, we found the distinction between 
classes of speech violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 
- -
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The key to those decisions, however, was the presence of a 
public forum. 13 In a public forum, by definition, all parties 
have a constitutional right of access and the state must dem-
onstrate compelling reasons for restricting access to a single 
class of speakers, a single viewpoint, or a single subject. 
When speakers and subjects are similarly situated, the 
state may not pick and choose. Conversely on government 
property that has not been made a public forum, not all 
speech is equally situated, and the, state may..,dral£ distinc-
tions which rela e to the special ur ose for which the prop-
e y IS used. As we ave explained above, for a school mail 
facility, th difference in stat s between the exclusive bar-
gaining representative and its rival IS sue a istmction. - ------- -::::.- .....____ - ----
v 
The Court of Appeals invalidated the limited privileges 
PEA negotiated as the bargaining voice of the Perry Town-
ship teachers by misapplying our cases that have dealt with 
the rights of free expression on streets, parks and other fora 
generally open for assembly and debate. Virtually every 
other court to consider this type of exclusive access policy has 
upheld it as constitutional, seen. 6, supra, and today, sod 
we. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
'
3 The Court emphasized the point in both cases. Mosely, supra at 96 
("Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content 
alone,"); Carey, supra at 461 (''When government regulation discrminiates 
among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection 
Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial 
state interests"). 
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From: Justice Brennan 
Circulated: JAN l l9S3 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-896 
PERRY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, APPELLANT v. 
PERRY LOCAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1983) 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
The Court today holds that an incumbent teachers' union 
may negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with a 
school board that grants the incumbent access to teachers' 
mailboxes and to the interschool mail system and denies such 
access to a rival union. Because the exclusive access provi-
sion in the collective bargaining agreement amounts to view-
point discrimination that infringes the respondents' First 
Amendment rights and fails to advance any substantial state 
interest, I dissent. 1 
I 
The Court properly acknowledges that teachers have pro-
tected First Amendment rights within the school context. 
See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). In particular, we have 
held that teachers may not be "compelled to relinquish the 
First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citi-
zens to comment on matters of public interest in connection 
with the operation of the public schools in which they work. 
... " Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568 
(1968). See also Mount Healthy City Board of Education v. 
' I agree with the Court's conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed 
for want of appellate jurisdiction. See ante, at -. 
~ 
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Doyle, 429 U. S. 274,284 (1977). We also have recognized in 
the school context the First Amendment right of "individuals 
to associate to further their personal beliefs," Healy v. 
James, 408 U. S. 169, 181 (1972), and have acknowledged the 
First Amendment rights of dissident teachers in matters in-
volving labor relations. City of Madison Joint School Dis-
trict v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 
U. S. 167, 176 n. 10 (1976). Against this background it is 
clear that the exclusive access policy in this case implicated 
the respondents' First Amendment rights by restricting their 
freedom of expression on issues important to the operation of 
the school system. As the Court of Appeals suggested, this 
speech is "if not at the very apex of any hierarchy of pro-
tected speech, at least not far below it." Perry Local 
Educators' Association v. Hohlt, 652 F. 2d 1286, 1299 (CA7 
1981). 
From this point of departure the Court veers sharply off 
course. Based on a finding that the interschool mail system 
is not a "public forum," ante at--, the Court states that 
the respondents have no right of access to the system, id., 
and that the school board is free "to make distinctions in ac-
cess on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity," id., 
if the distinctions are "reasonable in light of the purpose 
which the forum at issue serves." Ibid. According to the 
Court, the petitioner's status as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative provides a reasonable basis for the exclusive ac-
cess policy. 
The Court fundamentally misperceives the essence of the 
respondents' claims and misunderstands the thrust of the 
Court of Appeals' well-reasoned opinion. This case does not 
involve an "absolute access" claim. It involves an "equal ac-
cess" claim. As such it does not turn on whether the internal 
school mail system is a "public forum." In focusing on the 
public forum issue, the Court disregards the First Amend-
ment's central proscription against censorship, in the form of 
viewpoint discrimination, in any forum, public or nonpublic. 
- -
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A 
The First Amendment's prohibition against government 
discrimination among viewpoints on particular issues falling 
within the realm of protected speech has been noted exten-
sively in the opinions of this Court. In Niemotko v. Mary-
land, 340 U. S. 268 (1951), two Jehovah's Witnesses were de-
nied access to a public park to give Bible talks. Members of 
other religious organizations had been granted access to the 
park for purposes related to religion. The Court found that 
the denial of access was based on public officials' disagree-
ment with the Jehovah's Witnesses' views, id., at 272, and 
held it invalid. During the course of its opinion, the Court 
stated: "The right to equal protection of the laws, in the exer-
cise of those freedoms of speech and religion protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, has a firmer foundation 
than the whims or personal opinions of a local governing 
body." Ibid. In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter 
stated that "to allow expression of religious views by some 
and deny the same privilege to others merely because they or 
their views are unpopular, even deeply so, is a denial of equal 
protection of the law forbidden by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 273, 284 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in re-
sult). See also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67, 69 
(1953). 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District, supra, we held unconstitutional a decision by school 
officials to suspend students for wearing black armbands in 
protest of the war in Vietnam. The record disclosed that 
school officials had permitted students to wear other symbols 
relating to politically significant issues. Id., at 510. The 
black armbands, however, as symbols of opposition to the 
Vietnam War, had been singled out for prohibition. We 
stated: "Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one particu-
lar opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to 
avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork 
- -
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or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible." Id., at 
511. 
City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Commission, supra, considered the 
question of whether a state may constitutionally require a 
board of education to prohibit teachers other than union rep-
resentatives from speaking at public meetings about matters 
relating to pending collective bargaining negotiations. The 
board had been found guilty of a prohibited labor practice for 
permitting a teacher to speak who opposed one of the propos-
als advanced by the union in contract negotiations. The 
board was ordered to cease and desist from permitting em-
ployees, other than union representatives, to appear and to 
speak at board meetings on matters subject to collective bar-
gaining. We held this order invalid. During the course of 
our opinion we stated: "Whatever its duties as an employer, 
when the board sits in public meetings to conduct public busi-
ness and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to 
discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employ-
ment, or the content of their speech. See Police Dept. of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972)." 429 U. S. at 
176 (footnote omitted). 2 
2 See also Widmar V. Vincent, 454 u. s. 263, 280 (1981) (STEVENS, J., 
concurring in judgment) ("[T]he university ... may not allow its agree-
ment or disagreement with the viewpoint of a particular speaker to deter-
mine whether access to a forum will be granted. If a state university is to 
deny recognition to a student organization-or is to give it a lesser right to 
use school facilities than other student groups-it must have a valid reason 
for doing so"(citation omitted) (footnote omitted)); First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 784-786 (1978) ("In the realm of pro-
tected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating 
the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may ad-
dress a public issue. . . . Especially where, as here, the legislature's sup-
pression of speech suggests an attempt to give .one side of a debatable pub-
lic question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First 
Amendment is plainly offended" (citation omitted) (footnote omitted)); 
Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 187-188 (1972) (the state "may not re-
- -
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There is another line of cases, closely related to those im-
plicating the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination, 
that have addressed the First Amendment principle of sub-
ject matter, or content, neutrality. Generally, the concept 
of content neutrality prohibits the government from choosing 
the subjects that are appropriate for public discussion. The 
content neutrality cases frequently refer to the prohibition 
against viewpoint discrimination and both concepts have 
their roots in the First Amendment's bar against censorship. 
But unlike the viewpoint discrimination concept, which is 
used to strike down government restrictions on speech by 
· particular speakers, the content neutrality principle is in-
voked when the government has imposed restrictions on 
speech related to an entire subject area. The content neu-
trality principle can be seen as an outgrowth of the core First 
Amendment prohibition against viewpoint discrimination. 
See generally, Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its 
Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 
46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81 (1978). 
We have invoked the prohibition against content dis-
crimination to invalidate government restrictions on access to 
public forums. See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 
(1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972); 
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). 
We also have relied on this prohibition to strike down restric-
tions on access to a limited public forum. See, e.g., Widmar 
v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981). Finally, we have applied 
the doctrine of content neutrality to government regulation 
of protected speech in cases in which no restriction of access 
to public property was involved. See, e. g., Consolidated 
Edison Company v. Public Service Commission, 447 U. S. 
530 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205 
(1975). See also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 
strict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by 
any group to be abhorrent"). 
- -
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U. S. 490, 513, 515, 516 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
Admittedly, this Court has not always required content 
neutrality in restrictions on access to government property. 
We upheld content-based exclusions in Lehman v. City of 
Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974), in Greer v. Spock, 424 
U. S. 828 (1976), and in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' 
Union, 433 U. S. 119 (1977). All three cases involved an un-
usual forum, which was found to be nonpublic, and the speech 
was determined for a variety of reasons to be incompatible 
with the forum. These cases provide some support for the 
notion that the government is permitted to exclude certain 
subjects from discussion in nonpublic forums. 3 They pro-
vide no support, however, for the notion that government, 
once it has opened up government property for discussion of 
specific subjects, may discriminate among viewpoints on 
those topics. Although Greer, Lehman, and Jones permit-
ted content-based restrictions, none of the cases involved 
viewpoint discrimination. All of the restrictions were view-
point-neutral. We expressly noted in Greer that the exclu-
sion was "objectively and evenhandedly applied. " 424 
U. S. at 839. 4 
3 There are several factors suggesting that these decisions are narrow 
and of limited importance. First, the forums involved were unusual. A 
military base was involved in Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976), ad-
vertising space on a city transit system in Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), and a prison in Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners' Union, 433 U. S. 119 (1977). Moreover, the speech involved 
was arguably incompatible with each forum, especially in Greer, which in-
volved speeches and demonstrations of a partisan political nature on a mili-
tary base, and in Jones , which involved labor union organizational activi-
ties in a prison. Finally, we have noted the limited scope of Greer and 
Lehman in subsequent opinions. See, e. g. , Consolidated Edison Com-
pany v. Public Service Commission, 447 U. S. 530, 539-540 (1980); 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 514 n. 19 (1981) (plu-
rality opinion); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville , 422 U. S. 205, 209 
(1975). 
• In his concurring opinion in Greer v. Spock , supra, JUSTICE POWELL 
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Once the government permits discussion of certain subject 
matter, it may not impose restrictions that discriminate 
among viewpoints on those subjects whether a nonpublic fo-
rum is involved or not. 5 This prohibition is implicit in the 
Mosley line of cases, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969), and in 
those cases in which we have approved content-based restric-
tions on access to government property that is not a public 
forum. We have never held that government may allow dis-
cussion of a subject and then discriminate among viewpoints 
on that particular topic, even if the government for certain 
reasons may entirely exclude discussion of the subject from 
the forum. In this context, the greater power does not in-
clude the lesser because for First Amendment purposes exer-
cise of the lesser power is more threatening to core values. 
Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest form and 
government regulation that discriminates among viewpoints 
threatens the continued vitality of "free speech." 
B 
Against this background, it is clear that the Court's ap-
stated that the military authorities would be barred from discriminating 
among viewpoints on political issues. 424 U. S. at 848 n. 3. 
In other cases in which we have upheld restrictions on access to govern-
ment property, the restrictions have been both content and viewpoint-neu-
tral. See, e. g., United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh 
Civic Associations, 453 U. S. 114 (1981); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 
(1966). 
5 This is not to suggest that a government may not close a nonpublic 
forum altogether or limit access to the forum to those involved in the "offi-
cial business" of the agency. Restrictions of this type are consistent with 
the government's right "to preserve the property under its control for the 
use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Ante, at -- (quoting United 
States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 
U. S. 114, 129 (1981). Limiting access to a nonpublic government forum 
to those involved in the "official business" of the agency also protects the 
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proach to this case is flawed. By focusing on whether the 
interschool mail system is a ubl~sre-
gards the m epen en 1rst Amen men protection afforded 
by the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination. 6 This 
case does not involve a claim of an absolute right of access to ~ 
the forum to discuss any subject whatever. If it did, _.FUblic -.t::::::::::::----
forum analysis might be relevant. This case involves a claim 
6 Lower courts have recognized that the prohibition against viewpoint 
discrimination affords speakers protection independent of the public forum 
doctrine. See, e.g., National Black United Fund, Inc. v. Devine, 667 F. 
2d 173, 179 (CADC 1981); Jaffe v. Alexis, 659 F. 2d 1018, 1020-1021 n. 2 
(CA9 1981); Bonner-Lyons v. School Committee of the City of Boston, 480 
F. 2d 442, 444 (CAl 1973). In Jaffe , the Ninth Circuit stated: ''When the 
content of the speaker's message forms the basis for its selective regula-
tion, public forum analysis is no longer crucial; the government must still 
justify the restriction and the justification 'must be scrutinized more care-
fully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited 'merely because 
public officials disapprove of the speaker's views."' Jaffe v. Alexis, 
supra, at 1020-1021 n. 2 (citations omitted). See also United States Postal 
Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 454 U. S. 114, 136, 
140 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment). 
In Greer v. Spock, supra, I suggested that an undue focus on public fo-
rum issues can blind the Court to proper regard for First Amendment in-
terests. After noting that "the notion of 'public forum' has never been the 
touchstone of public expression .. : ," id., at 859 (BRENNAN, J ., dissent-
ing), I stated: 
Those cases permitting public expression without characterizing the locale 
involved as a public forum, together with those cases recognizing the exis-
tence of a public forum, albeit qualifiedly, evidence the desirability of a 
flexible approach to determining whether public expression should be pro-
tected. Realizing that the permissibility of a certain form of public ex-
pression at a given locale may differ depending on whether it is asked if the 
locale is a public forum or if the form of expression is compatible with the 
activities occurring at the locale, it becomes apparent that there is a need 
for a flexible approach. Otherwise, with the rigid characterization of a 
given locale as not a public forum, there is the danger that certain forms of 
public speech at the locale may be suppressed; even though they are basi-




PERRY ED. ASSN. v. PERRY LOCAL ED. ASSN. 9 
of equal access to discuss a subject that the board has ap-
proved for discussion in the forum. In essence, the respond-
ents are not asserting a right of access at all; they are assert-
ing a rig t o e ee om 1scrimmation. The critical 
inquiry, there!ore, is wliether the board's grant of exclusive 
access to the petitioners amounts to prohibited viewpoint 
discrimination. 
II 
The Court addresses only briefly the respondents' claim 
that the exclusive access provision amounts to viewpoint dis-
crimination. In rejecting this claim, the Court starts from 
the premise that the school mail system is not a public fo-
rum 7 and that, as a result, the board has no obligation to 
grant access to the respondents. The Court then suggests 
that there is no indication that the board intended to discour-
age one viewpoint and to advance another. In the Court's 
view, the exclusive access policy is based on the status of the 
respective parties rather than on their views. The Court 
then states that "implicit in the concept of the nonpublic fo-
rum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of 
subject matter and speaker identity." Ante, at--. Ac-
cording to the Court, "these distinctions may be impermissi-
7 ~ that the school mail system could qualify for treatment 
as a public forum of some description if one focuses on whether " 'the man-
ner of expression 1s incompattble witn the normal activity of a particular 
place at a particular time.' Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, 408 U. S. 
at 116." United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic As-
sociations, 453 U. S. 114, 136 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). It is difficult to see how granting the respondents access to the 
mailboxes would be incompatible with the normal activities of the school 
especially in view of the fact that the petitioner and outside groups enjoy 
such access. The petitioner's messages, and certainly those of the outside 
groups, do not appear to be any more compatible with the normal activity 
of the school than the respondents' messages would be. It is not necessary 
to reach this issue, however, in view of the existence of impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination. 
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ble in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the 
process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible 
with the intended purpose of the property." Ibid. 
As noted, whether the school mail system is a public forum 
or not the board is prohibited from discriminating among 
viewpoints on particular subjects. Moreover, whatever the 
right of public authorities to impose content-based restric-
tions on access to government property that is a nonpublic fo-
rum, 8 once access is granted to one speaker to discuss a cer-
tain subject access may not be denied to another speaker 
based on his viewpoint. Regardless of the nature of the fo-
rum, the critical inquiry is whether the board has engaged in 
prohibited viewpoint discrimination. 
The Court responds to the allegation of viewpoint dis-
crimination by suggesting that there is no indication that the 
board intended to discriminate and that the exclusive access 
policy is based on the parties' status rather than on their 
views. In this case, for reasons discussed below, see infra, 
at --, the intent to discriminate can be inf erred from the 
effect of the policy, which is to deny an effective channel of 
communication to the respondents, and from other facts in 
the case. In addition, the petitioner's status has nothing to 
do with whether viewpoint discrimination in fact has oc-
curred. If anything, the petitioner's status is relevant to the 
question of whether the exclusive access policy can be justi-
fied, not to whether the board has discriminated among view-
points. See infra, at --. 
Addressing the question of viewpoint discrimination di-
rectly, free of the Court's irrelevant public forum analysis, it 
8 The Court's reference to the government's right to make distinctions 
in access based on "speaker identity'' might be construed as a reference to 
the government's interest in restricting access to a nonpublic forum to 
those involved in the "official business" of the particular agency. See note 
5 SU'pra. The "speaker identity'' distinction in this case, however, cannot 
be justified on this basis. See note 10 infra. 
- -
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is clear that the exclusive access policy discriminates on the 
basis of viewpoint. The Court of Appeals found that "the ac-
cess policy adopted by the Perry schools, in form a speaker 
restriction, favors a particular viewpoint on labor relations in 
the Perry schools ... : the teachers inevitably will receive 
from [the petitioner] self-laudatory descriptions of its activi-
ties on their behalf and will be denied the critical perspective 
offered by [the respondents]." Perry Local Educators' As-
sociation v. Hohlt, 652 F. 2d 1286, 1296 (CA7 1981). This 
assessment of the effect of the policy is eminently reasonable. 
Moreover, certain other factors strongly suggest that the pol-
icy discriminates among viewpoints. 
On a practical level, the only reason for the petitioner to 
seek an exclusive access policy is to deny its rivals access to 
an effective channel of communication. No other group is 
explicitly denied access to the mail system. In fact , as the 
Court points out, ante at --, many other groups have been 
granted access to the system. Apparently, access is denied 
to the respondents because of the likelihood of their express-
ing points of view differe t from the petitioner's on a range of 
subjects. The very argumen e petitioner advances in 
support of the policy, the need to preserve labor peace, also 
indicates that the access policy is not viewpoint-neutral. 
In short, the exclusive access policy 1scnmmates against 
the respondents based on their viewpoint. The board has 
chosen to amplify the speech of the petitioner, while repress-
ing the speech of the respondents based on the respondents' 
point of view. This sort of discrimination amounts to censor-
ship and infringes the First Amendment rights of the re-
spondents. In this light, the policy can survive only if the 
petitioner can justify it. 
III 
In assessing the validity of the exch;isive access policy, the 
Court of Appeals subjected it to rigorous scrutiny. Perry 
Local Educators' Association v. Hohlt, supra, at 1296. The 
~~e,e,J I r~~ f 
.f. < ~ ·.s Q11Celvi'~ 
~
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court pursued this course after a careful review of our cases 
and a determination that "no case has applied any but the 
most exacting scrutiny to a content or speaker restriction 
that substantially tended to favor the advocacy of one point of 
view on a given issue." Id., at 1296. The Court of Appeals' 
analysis is persuasive. In light of the fact that viewpoint 
discrimination implicates core First Amendment values, the 
exclusive access policy can be sustained "only if the govern-
ment can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means 
of serving a compelling state interest." Consolidated Edi-
son Company v. Public Service Commission, 447 U. S. 530, 
540 (1980). Cf. Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 461-62 
(1980) (to be valid legislation must be "finely tailored to serve 
substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for 
any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized"); Po-
lice Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 98-99 
(1972) (discriminations "must be tailored to serve a substan-
tial governmental interest"). 
A 
The petitioner attempts to justify the exclusive access pro-
vision based on its status as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative for the teachers and on the state's interest in effi-
cient communication between collective bargaining 
representatives and the members of the unit. The petition-
er's status and the state's interest in efficient communication 
are important considerations. They are not sufficient, how-
ever, to sustain the exclusive access policy. 
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, the exclusive access 
policy is both "overinclusive and underinclusive" as a means 
of serving the state's interest in the efficient discharge of the 
petitioner's legal duties to the teachers. Perry Local 
Educators' Association v. Hohlt, supra, at 1300. The policy 
is overinclusive because it does not strictly limit the petition-
er's use of the mail system to performance of its special legal 
duties and underinclusive because the board permits outside 
- -
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organizations with no special duties to the teachers, or to the 
students, to use the system. Ibid. The Court of Appeals 
also suggested that even if the board had attempted to tailor 
the policy more carefully by denying outside groups access to 
the system and by expressly limiting the petitioner's use of 
the system to messages relating to its official duties, "the fit 
would still be questionable, for it might be difficult-both in 
practice and in principle-effectively to separate 'necessary' 
communications from propaganda." Ibid. The Court of Ap-
peals was justly concerned with this problem, because the 
scope of the petitioner's "legal duties" might be difficult, if 
not impossible, to define with precision. In this regard, we 
alluded to the potential scope of collective bargaining respon-
sibilities in City of Madison Joint School District v. Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U. S. 167 
(1976), when we stated: "[T]here is virtually no subject con-
cerning the operation of the school system that could not also 
be characterized as a potential subject of collective bargain-
ing." Id., at 177. 9 
9 The Court rejects the Court of Appeals' finding that the exclusive ac-
cess policy was overinclusive on the ground that "the record ... does not 
establish that [the petitioner] enjoyed or claimed unlimited access by usage 
or otherwise; indeed, the collective bargaining agreement indicates that 
the right of access was accorded to [the petitioner] 'acting as the represent-
ative of the teachers ... .'" Ante at n. 12. Under these circumstances, 
the Court suggests that it is unnecessary "to decide the reasonableness of a 
grant of access for unlimited purposes." Ibid. This argument is flawed in 
three ways. First, the Court of Appeals found that "the collective bar-
gaining agreement [did] not limit [the petitioner's] use of the mail system 
to messages related to its special legal duties ... ," Perry Local Educators 
Association v. Hohlt, 652 F. 2d 1286, 1300 (CA71981), and there is nothing 
in the record to indicate that the petitioner did not enjoy unlimited access. 
Second, we noted above the nearly limitless scope of collective bargaining 
responsibilities. See supa, at --. With no apparent monitoring of the 
petitioner's messages by the board, Perry Local Educators' Association v. 
Hohlt, supa, at 1293 n. 29, it is clear that there is no real limit to the peti-
tioner's "special legal duties.'' Finally, even assuming that the board had 
- -
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Putting aside the difficulties with the fit between this pol-
icy and the asserted interests, the Court of Appeals properly 
pointed out that the policy is invalid "because it furthers no 
discernible state interest." Perry Local Educators' Associ-
ation v. Hohlt, supra, at 1300. While the board may have a 
legitimate interest in granting the petitioner access to the 
system, it has no legitimate interest in making that access ex-
clusive by denying access to the respondents. As the Court 
of Appeals stated: ''Without an independent reason why 
equal access for other labor groups and individual teachers is 
undesirable, the special duties of the incumbent do not justify 
opening the system to the incumbent alone." Ibid. In this 
case, for the reasons discussed below, there is no independ-
ent reason for denying access to the respondents. 10 
a narrowly tailored policy that expressly limited the petitioner's access to 
official messages and included school monitoring of the messages, it still 
would be difficult, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, "to separate 'neces-
sary' communications from propaganda." Ibid. at 1300. 
The Court rejects the Court of Appeals' determination that the policy 
was underinclusive on the ground that there was no district policy of "open 
access for private groups and, in any event, the provision of access to these 
private groups does not undermine the reasons for not allowing similar ac-
cess by a rival labor union (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 838 n. 10 
(1976)." Ante at n. 12. Even though there was no apparent policy of 
open access, the provision of access to outside groups certainly undermines 
the petitioner's asserted justification for the policy and establishes that the 
policy is overinclusive with respect to that justification. Moreover, if all 
unions were denied access to the mail system, there might be some force to 
the Court's reliance on Greer for the notion that granting access to some 
groups does not undermine the reasons for denying it to others. But in a 
case where the government grants access to one labor group, and denies it 
to another, Greer is irrelevant because even read broadly Greer does not 
support a right on the part of the government to discriminate among view-
points on subjects approved for discussion in the forum. See supra, at 
10 A variant of the "special legal duties" justification for the exclusive ac-
cess policy is the "official business" justification. As noted, see note 5 
supra, the government has a legitimate interest in limiting access to a non-
- -
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B 
The petitioner also argues, and the Court agrees, ante at 
--, that the exclusive access policy is justified by the 
state's interest in preserving labor peace. As the Court of 
Appeals found, there is no evidence on this record that grant-
ing access to the respondents would result in labor instabil-
ity. Id., at 1301. 11 In addition, there is no reason to assume 
public forum to those involved in the "official business" of the agency. 
This interest may justify restrictions based on speaker identity, as for ex-
ample, when a school board denies access to a classroom to persons other 
than teachers. Such a speaker identity restriction may have a viewpoint 
discriminatory effect, but it is justified by the government's interest in 
clear, definitive classroom instruction. 
In this case, an "official business" argument is inadequate to justify the 
exclusive access policy for many of the same reasons that the "special legal 
duties" rationale is inadequate. As with its relation to the "special legal 
duties" argument, the exclusive access policy is both overinclusive and 
underinclusive with respect to an "official business" justification. First, as 
the Court of Appeals pointed out, the school board neither monitors nor 
endorses the petitioner's messages. Perry Local Educators' Association 
v. Hohlt, supa, at 1293 n. 29. In this light, it is difficult to consider the 
petitioner an agent of the board. Moreover, in light of the virtually unlim-
ited scope of a union's collective bargaining duties, it expands the definition 
of "official business" beyond any clear meaning to suggest that the petition-
er's messages are always related to the school system's "official business." 
More importantly, however, the only board policy discernible from this 
record involves a denial of access to one group: the respondents. The 
board has made no explicit effort to restrict access to those involved in the 
"official business" of the schools. In fact, access has been granted to out-
side groups such as parochial schools, church groups, YMCAs, and Cub 
Scout units. See ante, at --. It is difficult to discern how these groups 
are involved in the "official business" of the school. The provision of ac-
cess to these groups strongly suggests that the denial of access to the re-
spondents was not based on any desire to limit access to the forum to those 
involved in the "official business" of the schools; instead, it suggests that it 
was based on hostility to the point of view lik_ely to be expressed by the 
respondents. The board simply has chosen/to shut out one voice on a sub-
ject approved for discussion in the forum. This is impermissible. 
11 The Court suggests that proof of disruption is not necessary "to justify 
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that the respondents' messages would be any more likely to 
cause labor discord when received by members of the major-
ity union than the petitioner's messages would when received 
by the respondents. Moreover, it is noteworthy that both 
the petitioner and the respondents had access to the mail 
system for some time prior to the representation election. 
See ante, at --. There is no indication that this policy re-
sulted in disruption of the school environment. 
Although the state's interest in preserving labor peace in 
the schools in order to prevent disruption is unquestionably 
substantial, merely articulating the interest is not enough to 
sustain the exclusive access policy in this case. There must 
be some showing that the asserted interest is advanced by 
the policy. In the absence of such a showing, the exclusive 
access policy must fall. 12 
the denial of access to a non-public forum on grounds that the proposed use 
may disrupt the property's intended function ... ," ante at -- n. 11, 
and again cites Greer v. Spock, SU'pra. In Tinker v. Des Moines Commu-
nity School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969), which is discussed supra at--, 
we noted that "in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of dis-
turbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." 
Id., at 508. Later, we stated that "where there is no finding and no show-
ing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the oper-
ation of the school,' the prohibition cannot be sustained." Id., at 509 
(citation omitted). Finally, we stated that "the prohibition of expression 
of one particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to 
avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, 
is not constitutionally permissible." Id., at 511. It is noteworthy that 
Tinker involved what the Court would be likely to describe as a nonpublic 
forum. See also City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Commission, 429 U. S. 167, 173-174 (1976); Healy v. 
James, 408 U. S. 169, 190-191 (1972). These cases establish that the state 
must offer evidence to support an allegation of potential disruption in order 
to sustain a restriction on protected speech. 
12 The Court also cites the availability of alternative channels of commu-
nication in support of the "reasonableness" of the exclusive access policy. 
Ante at--. In a detailed discussion, the Court of Appeals properly con-
• - -
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Because the grant to the petitioner of exclusive access to 
the internal school mail system amounts to viewpoint dis-
crimination that infringes the respondents' First Amendment 
rights and because the petitioner has failed to show that the 
policy furthers any substantial state interest, the policy must 
be invalidated as violative of the First Amendment. 
IV 
For the reasons already discussed, it also is clear that the 
exclusive access policy violates the equal protection clause. 
The Court rejects the respondents' equal protection argu-
ment on the ground that the policy does not burden the re-
spondents' First Amendment rights. Ante at --. As 
noted, the policy does burden a fundamental interest of the 
respondents by subjecting them to viewpoint discrimination 
that infringes their First Amendment rights. In this light, 
the policy must be subjected to searching scrutiny. See Po-
lice Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); 
Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980). Because the peti-
tioner has failed to show that the policy advances any sub-
stantial state interest, the policy is invalid under the equal 
protection clause as well as under the First Amendment. 
V 
In order to secure the First Amendment's guarantee of 
eluded that the other channels of communication available to the respond-
ents were "not nearly as effective as the internal mail system." Perry 
Local Educators' Association v. Hohlt, surrra, at 1299. See also id., at 
1299-1300. In addition, the Court apparently disregards the principle 
that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropri-
ate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other 
place." Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939). In this case, the 
t existence of inferior alternative channels of communication does not affect 
the conclusion that the petitioner has failed to justify the viewpoint-dis-
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freedom of speech and to prevent distortions of "the market-
place of ideas," see Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), governments generally 
are prohibited from discriminating among viewpoints on is-
sues within the realm of protected speech. In this case the 
board has infringed the respondents' First Amendment 
rights by granting exclusive access to an effective channel of 
communication to the petitioner and denying such access to 
the respondents. In view of the petitioner's failure to estab-
lish even a substantial state interest that is advanced by the 
exclusive access policy, the policy must be held to be con-
stitutionally infirm. The decision of the court of appeals 
should be affirmed. 
January 6 , 1983 
81- 896 Perrv Educ a t ion A.ssociation 
Dear Si 11": 




cc: , The Conference 
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